tpm2-software.github.io Enabling the TPM2.0 Ecosystem in Linux


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(filling in for Peter Huewe)

Who am I?

- 13 year on/off TPMs
- Fraunhofer SIT: Trustworthy Platforms
- TCG-member: TPM Software Stack WG
- Maintainer
 - tpm2-tss: The libraries
 - tpm2-tss-engine: The OpenSSL engine
 - tpm2-totp: Computer-to-user attestation (mjg's tpm-totp reimplemented for 2.0)

Putting TPMs into things



Agenda

- Introducing TPMs
- Introducing the TSS

- Existing TSS software
- What's new?

Introduction to TPMs

Trusted Platform Module (TPM) 2.0

- Smartcard-like capabilities but soldered in
- Remote Attestation capabilities
- As separate chip (LPC, SPI, I²C)
- In Southbridge / Firmware
- Via TEEs/TrustZone, etc
- Thanks to Windows-Logos in every PC

· CPU

- OS, TSS 2.0, applications

Introduction to TPMs

Getting started

- Any PC with a Windows Logo
 ACPI based discovery
- A Raspberry-PI with a TPM daughterboard
 On Raspbian:

/boot/config.txt: dtparam=spi=on dtoverlay=tpm-slb9670

tpm2-tss/INSTALL.md

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The TPM Software Stack 2.0

- Kernel exposes /dev/tpm0 with byte buffers
- TCG specifications:
 - TPM spec for functionality
 - TSS spec for software API
- tpm2-tss is an implementation
- APIs for application integration
- Support in other modules and middle wares for seamless integration

The TSS APIS

System API (sys)

- 1:1 to TPM2 cmds
- Cmd / Rsp serialization
- No file I/O
- No crypto
- No heap / malloc

Enhanced SYS (esys)

- Automate crypto for HMAC / encrypted sessions
- Dynamic TCTI loading
- Memory allocations
- No file I/O

Feature API (FAPI)

- Spec in draft form
- No custom typedefs
- JSON interfaces
- Provides Policy language
- Provides keystore
- Sec/func separation

TPM Command Transmission Interface (tss2-tcti)

- Abstract command / response mechanism,
- Decouple APIs from command transport / IPC
- No crypto, heap, file I/O
- Dynamic loading / dlopen API

TPM Access Broker and Resource Manager (TAB/RM)

- Abstract Storage Limitations
- No crypto


• Power management

TPM Device Driver

- Device Interface (CRB / polling)
- Pre-boot log handoff

e r n e

Projects overview



The tpm2-software core projects

- tpm2-tss (core library)
 - Autotools, pkg-config, deps: libcrypto OR libgcrypt coming deps: libcurl, libjson-c
- tpm2-abrmd (user space RM)
 - Autotools, pkg-config, deps: libdbus, libglib
- tpm2-tools (CLI tools)
 - Autotools, pkg-config, deps: libcrypto, libcurl
- tpm2-pytss (python bindings)
- tpm2-tss-engine (OpenSSL-engine)
- tpm2-totp (PC-to-human authentication)

People and community

Maintainers:

- Bill, Imran, Jonas, Jürgen, John, Phil, Peter,
 Tadeusz, and me
- >100 contributors
- CI with ~80% coverage targets, scanbuild, coverity, CII best practice, lgtm, ...
- Building multi-distro CI using docker

Tags tags tags



Tested in many ways

 Packaged for many distros




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Existing TSS things

- Mostly anything runs off of Esys_*()
- Povides 1-to-1 mapping of TPM functionality
- Automates
 - marshalling / unmarshaling
 - Object meta-data handling
 - session encryption and authentication
 - memory allocation
 - TPM detection sequence (tpm2-abrmd, /dev/tpmrm0, /dev/tpm0, simulator)
- tpm2-tools >= 4.0 use Esys
- tpm2-pytss uses Esys



Device Driver


TPM2

UC: Shielded key storage and usage

- Keys in RAM are always dangerous
 - "Heartbleed"
- Keys on Disk are always dangerous
 - You can protect them with user passwords but they can be bruteforced
 - Servers have no unlock step
 - Embedded devices have no unlock step
- So how do you prevent ID-cloning?
 - → Use TPM

UC: Shielded key storage and usage

- How do you use the TPM ?
 - → easy: tpm2-tss-engine



UC: Disk encryption

"Bitlocker for Linux"

- Binding the disk to the machine
- Short PIN instead of long passwords
- No more dictionary attacks

Even more utility in other areas

- Data Center: People stealing HDDs from the rack
- Embedded device once more
- Binding to BIOS integrity status (local attestation)

UC: Disk encryption

cryptsetup(-tpm) / LUKS2

- Rearchitecting with Milan
- Making cryptsetup "module-aware"

```
Please unlock disk nvme0n1p3_crypt
```

```
"keyslots": {
  "1": {
    "type": "tpm2",
    "key_size": 32,
    "area": {
        "type": "tpm2nv",
        "nvindex": 2929459;
        "pcrselection": 0,
        "pcrbanks": 1,
        "noda": true
    },
```

```
afuchs@pc-fuchslap3:~/Dokumente/oss-tss/cryptsetup-tpm-incubator$ ./cryptsetup luksFormat --type=luks2 --tpm disk.img

WARNING!
========

Hiermit werden die Daten auf »disk.img« unwiderruflich überschrieben.

Are you sure? (Type uppercase yes): YES

Geben Sie die Passphrase für »disk.img« ein:

Passphrase bestätigen:

afuchs@pc-fuchslap3:~/Dokumente/oss-tss/cryptsetup-tpm-incubator$ ./cryptsetup luksOpen disk.img --test-passphrase

Geben Sie die Passphrase für »disk.img« ein:

afuchs@pc-fuchslap3:~/Dokumente/oss-tss/cryptsetup-tpm-incubator$ ■
```

UC: (VPN) user authentication

- UserName + Password ?
 - → Machine + UserPassword !
 Adding security to network access
- OpenConnect (David Woodhouse)
 - Reuse (copy) of tpm2-tss-engine
- Strongswan
 - Implements Attestation and RIMs as well
- OpenVPN via tpm2-tss-engine ?
- Missing WireGuard, Tinc, ...

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What's new? libtss2-fapi.so!

TCG specifications

- TSS 2.0 Feature API spec
- TSS 2.0 JSON and Policy Data spec

Features

- No TPM-specific data structures:
 Using JSON for all in-/output
- Decouple functional design from security design:
 Using cryptographic profiles
- Add a keystore:
 Store TPM's blobs and meta data on disk
- Add a policy language:
 Describe policies in JSON and automatically evaluate policies upon use
- PRs with >25k LoC on tpm2-tss, -tools, -pkcs11

API Code comparison (Signing)

&sessionHandle, &tpmNonce);

Application CalculateSessionKey(

session.salt, &session.key);

Tss2 Sys Load Prepare(sctx,

Tss2 Sys GetDecryptParam();

Tss2 Svs SetDecrvptParam();

Application CalculateHmac(

Tss2 Sys SetCmdAuths(sctx,

sessionHandle, hmac);

Tss2 Sys Execute (sctx);

Application EncryptParamter();

Application CalculateCpHash(cc,

Application CalculateRpHash(cc,

keyName, rpBuffer, &rpHash);

session.key, session.nonceTPM,

srkHandle, keyblob);

FAPI [2 lines of code]

```
Fapi Sign async (fctx,
  "name/of/my/key", payload);
Fapi Sign finish (fctx,
  &signature);
```

ESAPI [9 lines of code]

```
Esys TR SetAuthValue (ectx,
  srkTR, authValue);
Esys StartAuthSession (ectx,
  srkTR, &sessionTR);
Esys Load async (ectx, srkTR,
  sessionTR, keyblob);
Esys Load finish (ectx,
  &kevTR);
Esys TR SetAuthValue (ectx,
  kevTR, authValue);
Esys RSA Sign async (ectx,
  srkTR, sesstionTR,
  parameters);
Esys RSA Sign finish (ectx,
  &paremters)
Esys FlushContext (ectx,
   sessionTR);
Esys FlushContext (ectx,
   kevTR);
```

SAPI

[32 lines of code] Application VerifyHmac(session.key, Application EncryptSalt(session.salt, &encryptedSalt); myNonce, cc, rpHash, rspAuth, Tss2 Sys StartAuthSession(sctx, &tpmNonce); srkHandle, encryptedSalt,

```
Tss2 Sys Load Finish (sctx,
                                         &keyHandle);
                                      Tss2 Sys RSA Sign Prepare (sctx,
                                         kevHandle, parameter);
                                      Tss2 Sys GetCommandCode(sctx, &cc);
                                      Tss2 Sys GetCpBuffer(sctx, &buffer);
Application GetMetadata(session.key, Application CalculateCpHash(cc,
  session.nonceTPM, srkName, kevName);
                                         kevName, buffer, &cpHash);
Tss2 Sys GetCommandCode (sctx, &cc);
                                      Application CalculateHmac (
Tss2 Sys GetCpBuffer(sctx, &buffer);
                                         session.key, session.nonceTPM,
                                        myNonce, cpHash, authValue, &hmac);
                                      Tss2 Sys SetCmdAuths (sysConext,
                                         sessionHandle, hmac);
                                      Tss2 Sys Execute (sctx);
  srkName, keyName, buffer, &cpHash); Tss2 Sys GetRspAuths(sctx, &rspAuths)
                                      Tss2 Sys GetRpBuffer(sctx, &buffer);
                                      Application CalculateRpHash(cc,
  myNonce, cpHash, authValue, &hmac);
                                         keyName, rpBuffer, &rpHash);
                                      Application VerifyHmac (session.key,
                                        myNonce, cc, rpHash, rspAuth,
                                         &tpmNonce);
Tss2 Sys GetRspAuths (sctx, &rspAuths) Tss2 Sys RSA Sign Finish (sctx,
Tss2 Sys GetRpBuffer(sctx, &buffer);
                                         &paramenter);
                                       Tss2 Sys FlushContext(sctx,
                                         sessionHandle);
                                      Tss2 Sys FlushContext(sctx,
                                         keyHandle);
```

Policy Comparison

```
• ESYS:
                                           FAPI:
TPML PCR SELECTION pcrSelection = {
    .count = 1, .pcrSelections = {
                                             "description": "PCR 16 value",
    { .hash = TPM2 ALG SHA1,
      .sizeofSelect = 3,
                                             "policy":[
      .pcrSelect = {00, 00, 01} } };
TPM2B DIGEST pcr digest zero = {
                                                   "type": "POLICYPCR",
  .size = 20, .buffer = \{0x67, 0x68, 0x03,
0x3e, 0x21, 0x64, 0x68, 0x24, 0x7b, 0xd0,
                                                    "pcrs":[
0x31, 0xa0, 0xa2, 0xd9, 0x87, 0x6d, 0x79,
0x81, 0x8f, 0x8f}};
                                                          "pcr":16,
r = Esys StartAuthSession(esys context,
                                                          "hashAlg":"SHA1",
       ESYS TR NONE, ESYS TR NONE,
        ESYS TR NONE, ESYS TR NONE,
                                                          " digest":"00...00"
        ESYS TR NONE, &nonceCallerTrial,
       TPM2 SE POLICY, &symmetric,
       TPM2 ALG SHA1, &session);
r = Esys PolicyPCR(esys context, session,
        ESYS TR NONE, ESYS TR NONE,
        ESYS TR NONE, &pcr digest zero,
        &pcrSelection);
```

UC: (General) user authentication

Typical SmartCard workflow (PKCS11)

- Proof of possession (of smartcard)
- Proof of knowledge (of PIN not password)
- More secure and convenient than passwords


→ tpm2-pkcs11 (Virtual SmartCard)

- Proof of possession (of TPM-holding device)
- Proof of knowledge
- Fully compatible
- Heavy rework to run off of FAPI

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What's missing?

Attestation

- Some support by FAPI; protocol bindings
- Reference value descriptions

More core system integration

- 802.1X: NetworkManager, systemd-networkd
- User keyrings: gnome-keyring, kwallet
- VPNs: Wireguard, Tinc, ...
- Signing: GnuPG
- WebCrypto / WebAuthn (Firefox, Chrome, ...)
-

2nd maintainer for tpm2-tss-engine :-)

Questions?

https://tpm2-software.github.io